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at 618 (citing City of Los Angeles v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 US. 789,
796-98 ( 1.984)). A statute should not be
struck down for being overbroad, "unless there is a realistic danger that the
statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court."
[d. at 465, 569 A2d at 618 (quoting
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 us. at 801).
Section 121 contains applicable enforcement standards, and does not reach
beyond conduct which can be regulated
consistent with the first amendment.
The court concluded, therefore, that
Section 121 was not overbroad. [d.
Judge Eldridge argued vehemently
against state restrictions on the volume
level of protected speech in his dissent.
Judge Eldridge was of the opinion that
Diehl stood for the proposition that the
phrase "loud and unseemly" could only
serve to limit speech which "presented
a clear and present danger of violence,
or [speech] not intended as communications but merely as a guise to disturb
other persons." [d at 470, 569 A2d at
620 (Eldridge,]., dissenting). He found
Section 121 unconstitutional as applied
because the limitations on speech made
the delivery ofspeech a crime.[d at 473,
569 A.2d at 622 (Eldridge,]., dissenting). Judge Eldridge went on to note
that" [a)nnoyance at ideas can be cloaked
in annoyance at sound" [d. at 475,569
A.2d at 623 (quoting Saia v. New York,
334 us. 558,562 (1948)) (Eldridge,].,
dissenting). He then criticized the
majority which found that "[s]ound is
one of the most intrusive means of
communication," and pointed out that
"sound, in the form of the spoken word,
is the most basic thing protected by the
First Amendment." [d. at 476, 569 A.2d
at 624 (Eldridge,]., dissenting).
Judge Eldridge found the court's requirement of prior warning an illusory,
ineffective protection as any time
government authorities desire to suppress first amendment activity, they
could easily find complainants to give
prior warnings. [d. at 490, 569 A2d at
630 (Eldridge, ]., dissenting). He believed that Eanes' speech was within his
constitutional guarantees and concluded
his dissent expressing his fear for those
persons who speak on controversial
topics. [d. at 500, 569 A.2d at 635-36.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
"balanc[ed] one's right to express him-

finding that the initial encounter was
not a seizure. Jones was convicted. [d
The court of special appeals affirmed
the conviction, finding the initial encounter was a "mere accosting", and not
a seizure under the fourth amendment.
[d. at 282, 572 A.2d at 171. The court
determined that the stop was a "mere
accosting" because there was no show
of force or weapons used to effectuate
the stop; and, therefore, the trial court
properly denied the motion to suppress.
[d. The court of appeals granted
- Kimberly A. Doyle
certiorari.
The issue on appeal was whether the
Jones v. State: THE FOURTH
stop was a legal seizure under the fourth
AMENDMENT IS VIOLATED
amendment. Jones argued that an illegal
WHEN POliCE STOP A
stop and seizure occurred when the
BICYCliST WITHOUT
police ordered the stop of his bicycle
REASONABLE ARTICULABLE
without reasonable articulable suspicion.
SUSPICION
[d. The state posited two competing
In Jones v. State, 319 Md. 279,572
arguments. Either there was no error
A2d 169 (1990), the Court of Appeals
by the trial judge and therefore, the stop
of Maryland, held that a police stop of a
was consensual rather than custodial in
bicyclist for investigatory purposes based
nature and was not a seizure. Alternaon a hunch, without a reasonable articutively, if the stop was a seizure, there was
lable suspicion justifying the stop, viosufficient articulable suspicion to justify
lated the fourth amendment. The court
the stop. [d.
reasoned that a seizure occurred when
The court began its analysis by stating
the officer commanded the bicyclist to
the general rule that a police stop is a
stop, thus affording fourth amendment
seizure when a reasonable person would
protection.
feel that his freedom to walk away was
Carl Lee J ones was riding his bicycle
restrained. [d. at 282, (citing Terry v.
at 3:20 a.m. carrying a grocery bag hangOhio, 392 US. 1 (1968)). Additionally,
ing from the handlebars and, apparently,
the court, in distinguishing a seizure
drycleaning bags across his shoulders
from a "mere accosting" held that a
and travelled from the general direction
seizure occurs when an individual to
of a drycleaning store. The area where
whom questions are posed does not feel
J ones was riding had been the scene of
free to disregard the questions and walk
several recent burglaries. Officer Brown
away. [d. at 283, 572 A.2d 171 (citing
spotted Jones and in language to the
U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 us. 544
effect of "hey, could you come here,"
( 1980)). Adopting a totality of the circommanded him to stop. Once stopped,
cumstances approach to determine what
the officer noticed a bulge in Jones'
constitutes a seizure, the court stated
jacket pocket that appeared to be a
that one or all of the following factors
handgun. A pat down search yielded a
may persuade a trial court that a seizure
.25 caliber pistol. A subsequent search
occurred: (1) threatening presence of
of the grocery bag yielded various quanseveral officers; (2) show or use of a
tities of cocaine, marijuana, and other
weapon; (3) physical contact by the
p_araphemalia Jones was arrested and
officer; or ( 4) authoritative tone or lancharged with possession and intent to
guage by the officer indicating an order
distribute cocaine, possession of marirather than a request. [d.
juana, and unlawful wearing and transApplying the Mendenhall factors, the
porting of a handgun.
court noted in Florida v. Royer, 460 u.s.
491 (1983), that merely approaching an
Prior to trial, Jones made a motion to
individual and asking questions constisuppress the evidence on the ground
that the search and seizure was illegal
tuted a voluntary stop and was not a
seizure unless the person approached
because of the illegal stop. Jones, 319
Md. at 280, 572 A.2d at 170. The trial
was detained. Rejecting the use of a
court denied his motion based on its
bright line test, the court instead posited
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 21.1/TheLawForum-45
self and other's right to be free from
disruption." [d. at 467,569 A.2d at 619.
The Court concluded that Section 121 is
content-neutral, narrowly tailored to
serve a substantial governmental interest and leaves open ample alternative
channels of communication. Eanes was
given fair notice that the volume level of
his speech would be subject to prosecution ifit was not lowered. Therefore, the
statute did not violate Eanes' right to
free speech.

additional factors to consider when determining whether a seizure occurred:
( 1) police use of sirens or flashers;
(2) use of a command to stop or halt, or
show or use of a weapon; or (3) operating a road block or otherwise controlling the flow of traffic.]ones, 319 Md at
285, 572A.2dat 172 (citingMichiganv.
Chesternut, 486 u.s. 567 ( 1988) ).
In applying both the Mendenhall and
Chesternut factors, the court of appeals
found that the officer seized Jones when
he commanded him to stop because the
situation was such that a reasonable person would not feel free to walk away.
jones, 319 Md. at 285, 572 A.2d at 172.
First, the officer was uniformed and driving a marked police car, and the hail translated into a command to compel Jones
to stop. Further, the court stated, that it
was reasonable for the defendant to feel
constrained to stop, since to disobey or
ignore an officer would be an offense. [d.
(citing Md. Transp. Code Ann. section
21-103(a)( 1987)). Thus, the court conduded that" given these circumstances,
the average citizen, not being able to
distinguish a mere accosting from a
seizure, would have viewed the actions
of the police officer's intimidating
enough to have complied." jones, 319
Md. at 286,572 A.2d at 172-73.

The court analogized the level of
physical control over Jones by the police
with the level of control it held sufficient to constitute a seizure in State v.
Lemmon, 318 Md. 365, 568 A.2d 48
( 1990). In Lemmon, an officer identified himself to a suspect and stated
"come here" as a command to the suspect to stop. When the suspect ran, the
police chased him on foot and also tried
to block his escape with a police car.
The court held that the suspect was
seized by the police at the initial encounter when they commanded him to
stop. The jones court conduded that
Jones, like the suspect in Lemmon, was
seized when the police commanded
him to stop, because at that point, he did
not feel free to walk away. jones, 319
Md. at 287, 572 A.2d at 173.
Finding the initial encounter a seizure, the Court considered the state's
alternative argument regarding the reasonableness of the stop. [d. The court
noted that the officer admitted having
no knowledge of any crime committed
either at that approximate time or in
that approximate location. [d. The court
further noted that Jones was riding a
bicyde in an area where recent burglaries occurred, carring what appeared to
be drydeaning bags across his shoulders,

and travelling from the general direction of a drydeaning store, and that
these facts alone were not sufficient for
the officer to have formed a reasonable
and articulable suspicion to justify the
stop. [d. The court conduded that the
officer acted on a hunch that Jones was
involved in or fleeing from a crime when
he commanded him to stop; and, therefore, the stop was illegal. [d. at 288, 572
A.2d at 174.
The court of appeals has expanded
the holding in Lemmon to the factually
different case of a bicyclist, by finding
that Jones was seized at the point when
the officer commanded him to stop.
Thus, a police officer must have a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop a
bicyclist, like a motorist or pedestrian,
or the stop will violate the fourth
amendment.

- Laura Campbell
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A defense against cancer
can be cooked up in your kitchen.
Fruits, vegetables, and wholegrain cereals such as oatmeal, bran
and wheat may help lower the risk
of colorectal cancer.
Foods high in fats, salt- or
nitrite-cured foods like ham, and

There is evidence that diet
and cancer are related. Some
foods may promote cancer, while
others may protect you from it.
Foods related to lowering the risk of cancer of the
larynx and esophagus all have
high amounts of carotene,
a form of Vitamin A which
is in cantaloupes, peaches,
broccoli, spinach, all dark
green leafy vegetables, sweet
potatoes, carrots, pumpkin,
winter squash and tomatoes,
citrus fruits and brussels
sprouts.
Foods that may
help reduce the risk
of gastrointestinal
and respiratory
tract cancer are
cabbage, broccoli,
brussels sprouts,
kohlrabi, cauliflower.

fish and
types of sausages smoked by traditional methods should be
eaten in moderation.
Be moderate in
consumption of alcohol also.
A good rule of
thumb is cut down on
fat and don't be fat.
Weight reduction may
lower cancer risk. Our
12- year study of nearly a
million Americans uncovered
high cancer risks particularly
among people 40% or more
overweight.
Now, more than ever, we
know you can cook up your own
defense against cancer. So eat
healthy and be healthy.
No one faces
cancer alone.
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